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Abstract – In this contribution, we first argue that the ECtHR has come to develop a 
salient dualist reasoning under Articles 8-11. Although the ECtHR has held that all those 
articles serve the overarching ideal of ‘democratic society’, its right-based reasoning can 
be differentiated. On the one hand, the ECtHR has focused on the free circulation of ideas 
and opinions – in particular, those held on issues of public interest – in its treatment of the 
freedoms of expression (Article 10) and assembly and association (Article 11). The more 
those views are subject to prohibition, the more the margin of appreciation is reduced. On 
the other hand, the ECtHR has focused on the notion of ‘personal autonomy’ to adjust its 
margin of appreciation under Articles 8-9. The more personal autonomy is endangered, 
the more it reinforces the scrutiny in the assessment of reasons for an interference. 
Secondly, we argue that such dualist approach stands in need of clarification. Could 
individuals reasonably express and develop their views on issues of public interest 
without assuming their autonomy? Conversely, can the ECtHR assert that freedom of 
religion pertaining to the forum internum – typically, religious beliefs – has no relevance 
in the expression of personal views on issues of public interest? By contrast to most views 
in the literature, our argument does not rely on a prior normative theory of the virtues of a 
‘legal system’ – such as legal certainty, coherence and harmony – that generally target the 
ambiguous use of the margin of appreciation doctrine, or on a prior normative theory of 
the values that ECtHR should protect. Rather, our argument relies on the conceptual 
vagueness that follows from the ECtHR’s differential reasoning. The current application 
of the margin of appreciation implies that there are not only different ‘localised system of 
values’ among State Parties, but that there are different ‘localised democratic societies’. 
 
A. INTRODUCTION  
The European Court of Human Rights (hereafter, ‘the Court’) is a 
supranational and authoritative judicial organ in charge of determing what 
the forty-seven signatory states owe to individuals living under their 
jurisdictions as a matter of European Convention on Human Rights 
(hereafter, ‘ECHR’) law. While the law of the ECHR is shaped by an 
exceptionally accomplished judicial organ, the Court does not have the 
power to strike down a piece of domestic legislation. Nonetheless, according 
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to Article 32 ECHR, it holds the ultimate say over the interpretation, and 
therefore the scope, of ECHR rights.  
 In this article, we analyse and critically appraise the reasoning of the 
Court under Articles 8-11. First, we argue that the Court has developed a 
dualist reasoing under those Articles. On the one hand, the Court has 
employed ‘personal autonomy’ to adjust the margin of appreciation under 
Articles 8 – 9. The more personal autonomy is endangered, the more it 
reinforces the scrutiny in the assessment of reasons for an interference. On 
the other hand, the Court has focused on the free circulation of ideas and 
opinions – in particular, those held on issues of public interest – in its 
treatment of the freedoms to expression (Article 10) and association and 
assembly (Article 11). The more those views are subject to prohibition, the 
more the margin of appreciation is reduced. As we shall explain, such a 
protection is justified upon the need to maintain ‘pluralism’ in European 
democratic societies.  
 Second, we argue that such a dualist approach stands in need of 
clarification and justification. More precisely, we use normative theory 
(moral and political theory) to illuminate the problematic use of ‘personal 
autonomy’ in the reasoning of the Court. ‘Personal autonomy’ does not only 
figure among the most indeterminate concepts of the Court’s case law. It is 
also agreed that the concept of autonomy could justify the protection of all 
(ECHR) rights in an abstract sense. The basic Kantian capacity for self-
legislation may be used to play this overarching justificatory role. This 
framework is also salient in the emerging field of normative human rights 
theory. In a recent article, Valentini argues that human rights are necessary 
and sufficient conditions for a reasonable implementation of the right to 
freedom, understood in a Kantian sense.1 If this deontological premise holds, 
then the fact of circumscribing ‘personal autonomy’ just to some ECHR 
rights in some circumstances leaves other rights, as well as the concept itself, 
at pains. The routine of Court exercising its surveillance amounts to 
allocating portions of autonomy vis-à-vis the state. An abstract moral right to 
autonomy cannot provide the kind of action-guiding reasons that rights are 
expected to generate.  
 Moreover, the role of autonomy is salient in the Court’s emphasis on 
the ECHR rights that best serve ‘democratic society’. The higher protection 
                                                
1 Laura Valentini, ‘Human Rights, Freedom, and Political Authority’ (2012) 40 Political 
Theory 573. 
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of the expression of views on issues of public interest under Articles 10 – 11  
is justified by the need for recognition and cohesion in society and therefore 
depends on the equal right to have one’s views heard in respect of those 
issues. Such an emphasis cannot hold without a strong commitment to 
autonomy vis-à-vis the state that normative democratic theory terms 
‘equality of political status’. This basic political equality in turn justifies 
democratic rule and the right to regular, free and fair elections (Article 3 of 
Protocol 1) that the Court firmly connects to Articles 10 – 11. Leaving 
autonomy aside here would not only contradict its own emphasis on 
‘pluralism’ and the ‘right to be informed’ – as reinforcing the need of an 
options set to reflect upon – but it would also contradict the concept of 
democratic rule, roughly defined as the autonomy of the people qua political 
equals. Conversely, can the Court assert that freedom of religion pertaining 
to the forum internum – typically religious beliefs – has no relevance in the 
expression of personal views on issues of public interest? It is difficult to 
hold that one’s passionate political beliefs do not involve the special 
intensity that religious beliefs have, that religious beliefs have no impact on 
political opinions, or that it is for the Court to decide on those matters. In 
other words, not only the overarching justificatory role of autonomy for 
(human) rights, but also its specification through ‘democratic society’, 
reinforces the need for clarification and justification of the current use of the 
concept in the case law. 
 
B. THE DUALIST REASONING OF THE COURT UNDER ARTICLES 8 – 11 
A quick look at application of the restriction standards of Articles 8 – 11 
reveals the hetereogeneity of the Court’s reasoning. There is, of course, the 
standard of ‘democratic society’ in the three-pronged test that the Court 
applies when it finds an interference. The uniform application of the test 
originates in the almost identical structure and content of the second 
paragraph of Articles 8-11. To biefly recall them: the first step of the test 
reviews whether the interference under scrutiny has been ‘prescribed by law’ 
or ‘in accordance with law’.2 In the Court’s view, the standard is two-
pronged. First, the legal norm in question must be accessible to the 
individual – the publicity or accessibility of law requirement.3 Second, the 
                                                
2 For a recent case, see e.g. Avilkina and Others v Russia, App no 1585/09 (ECHR, 6 June 
2013), para 35-37. 
3 See e.g. Sunday Times v the United Kingdom, App no 6538/74 (ECHR, 26 April 1979), 
para 49; Lithgow v the United Kingdom, App no 9006/80 (ECHR, 8 July 1986), para 110. 
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legal norm must be  formulated with precision as to its meaning and scope – 
the foreseeability of the law requirement.4  
 The second step reviews whether the interference pursued a 
‘legitimate aim’ as specified in the second paragraph of Articles 8-11: the 
protection of public safety, public order, health or morals, or the protection 
of the rights and freedoms of others, etc. The Court only rarely finds a 
violation at this stage. This is explained by the recurrent conflation of the 
second step with the third and far more important step of ‘democratic 
necessity’ – that is, whether the interference was ‘necessary in a democratic 
society’ or whether there was a ‘pressing social need’ for it – in which the 
Court turns to a proper assessment of the justificatory grounds provided by 
the State Party. The assessment of the legitimate aim can itself trigger the 
margin of appreciation doctrine, such as in the case of Vona v Hungary5 
concerning a restriction of Article 10. This third step is by far the most 
evaluative and decisive step of the assessment process and the most 
controversial as well. As Fabre-Alibert puts it, what has to be understood by 
‘necessity in a democratic society’ is far from being clear6, and thus 
constitutes the flip-side of the coin: the margin of appreciation. The Court 
has unhelpfully specified that ‘democratic necessity’ implies that the 
interference must be “relevant and sufficient” 7  and “convincingly 
established”8 and that it must be “convincing and compelling”9, with the 
public interest “narrowly interpreted”.10 A rights and case-based analysis is 
needed to shed light on the normative choices of the Court and identify the 
dualistic elements.  
 
1. Article 8 
                                                
4 Malone v the United Kingdom, App no 8691/79 (ECHR, 2 August 1984), para 66; Silver 
and others v the United Kingdom, App no 5947/72, (ECHR, 25 March 1983), para 88. 
5 See e.g. Vona v Hungary, App no 35943/10 (ECHR, 9 July 2013), para 69. 
6 Véronique Fabre-Alibert, ‘La notion de « société démoctratique » dans la jurisprudence 
de la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme’ (1998) Revue trimestrielle des droits de 
l’homme 35, 465. 
7 Handyside v United Kingdom, App no 5493/72 (ECHR, 7 December 1976), para 50; 
Dudgeon v the United Kingdom, App no 7525/76 (ECHR, 24 February 1983), para 54; 
Barthold v Germany, App no 8734/79 (ECHR, 23 March 1985), para 55. 
8 Autronic v Switzerland, App no 12726/87 (ECHR, 22 May 1990), para 61; Weber v  
Switzerland, App no 3688/04 (ECHR, 26 July 2007), para 47. 
9 Freedom and Democracy Party (ÖZDEP) v Turkey, App no 23885/94 (ECHR, 8 
December 1999), para 44.  
10 Klass v Germany, App no 5029/71 (ECHR, 6 September 1978), para 42; Sunday Times 
v the United Kingdom (n 2), para 65. 
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In light of the case law, the right to respect for private and family life as 
enshrined in Article 8 constitutes a broad concept, which encompasses inter 
alia the right to personal autonomy and personal development.11 The Court 
has held that:  
“private life extends to aspects relating to personal identity, such as a 
person's name or picture, and furthermore includes a person's physical 
and psychological integrity; the guarantee afforded by Article 8 of the 
Convention is primarily intended to ensure the development, without 
outside interference, of the personality of each individual in his 
relations with other human beings. There is therefore a zone of 
interaction of a person with others, even in a public context, which 
may fall within the scope of private life”.12 
In the Court’s view, the concept of ‘private life’ is a broad term not 
susceptible to exhaustive definition. However, the Court does hold that, in 
order for Article 8 to come into play, it requires a certain level of serious 
interference, in a manner causing prejudice to personal enjoyment of the 
right to respect for private life.13 In determining the scope of private life, the 
Court insists, on the one hand, on the need to have in mind the notions of 
personal autonomy and human dignity.14 It is to be noted, however, that it 
“will depend on the circumstances of the particular case whether it is 
appropriate for the Court to focus on the ‘family life’ rather than the ‘private 
life’ aspect”.15 This means that the interference with privacy and family life 
does not necessarily affect personal autonomy. More generally, personal 
autonomy has been used in the contexts of life ending, sexual life, 
procreation and personal identity.16 The link therefore covers the typical area 
of protection of Article 8, namely ‘physical and psychological integrity’, in 
the vocabulary of the Court. 
 On the other hand, the Court has also argued that personal autonomy 
underlies all the guarantees of Article 8. In Pretty v the United Kingdom, the 
Court indicates that “although no previous case has established as such any 
                                                
11 Pretty v the United Kingdom, App no 2346/02 (ECHR, 29 April 2002), para 61; Gross 
v Switzerland, App no 67810/10 (ECHR, 14 May 2013), para 58. 
12 Pfeifer v Austria, App no 24733/04 (ECHR, 17 February 2011), para 33. 
13 Among others see Axel Springer AG v Germany, App no 39954/08 (ECHR, 7 February 
2012), para 83. 
14 Avram and others v Moldova, App no 41588/05 (ECHR, 5 July 2011), para 36. 
15 Üner v the Netherlands, App no 46410/99 (ECHR, 18 October 2006), para 59. 
16 Marckx v Belgium, App no 6833/74 (ECHR, 13 June 1979); A, B and C v Ireland App 
no 25579/05 (ECHR, 16 December 2010). 
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right to self-determination as being contained in Article 8 of the Convention, 
the Court considers that the notion of personal autonomy is an important 
principle underlying the interpretation of its guarantees”.17 This is surprising, 
for when personal autonomy does actually play a normative role in the 
reasoning, only a restricted area of personal choice is concerned. This is the 
case when the Court holds that a person may exercise a choice to die by 
declining to consent to medical treatment which might prolong life. In other 
cases, such as Tysiąc v Poland, the Court falls back on abstract concepts, in 
reiterating “that ‘private life’ is a broad term, encompassing, inter alia, 
aspects of an individual’s physical and social identity, including the right to 
personal autonomy, personal development and to establish and develop 
relationships with other human beings and the outside world”.18 In other 
words, while the concept seems operative in that the provisions (private life) 
are part of it, the Court does not offer a clear and independent specification 
of the concept. 
 The same vagueness can be observed in the scrutiny exercised by the 
Court when personal autonomy is concerned. What emerges from the Lashin 
v Russia case, which related to the interests of a mentally incapacitated 
patient, is that:  
“the extent of the State’s margin of appreciation in this context 
depends on two major factors. First, where the measure under 
examination has such a drastic effect on the applicant’s personal 
autonomy as in the present case, the Court is prepared to subject the 
reasoning of the domestic authorities to a somewhat stricter scrutiny. 
Second, the Court will pay special attention to the quality of the 
domestic procedure. Whilst Article 8 of the Convention contains no 
explicit procedural requirements, the decision-making process 
involved in measures of interference must be fair and such as to 
ensure due respect of the interests safeguarded by Article 8”.19 
In other words, the more personal autonomy is affected, the stricter the 
scrunity is. It is acknowledged that “the importance of the notion of personal 
autonomy to Article 8 and the need for a practical and effective 
interpretation of private life demand that, when a person’s personal 
autonomy is already restricted, greater scrutiny be given to measures which 
                                                
17 Pretty v the United Kingdom (n 10), para 61. 
18 Tysiąc v Poland, App no 5410/03 (ECHR, 20 March 2007), para 107. 
19 Lashin v Russia, App no 33117/02 (ECHR, 22 January 2013), para 81. 
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remove the little personal autonomy that is left”.20 However, such a scrutiny 
may play a minor role in the Court’s assessment of the margin of 
appreciation. For instance, in the Molka v Poland decision the Court held 
that “the margin of appreciation is even wider as the issue at stake involves 
the provision of adequate access for the disabled to polling stations, which 
must necessarily be assessed in the context of the allocation of limited State 
resources”.21  
 With regard to Article 8 taken together with Article 14, it is well 
established that “the Contracting States enjoy a margin of appreciation in 
assessing whether and to what extent differences in otherwise similar 
situations justify a difference of treatment”.22 The case X and Others v 
Austria concerned a complaint by two women living in a stable homosexual 
relationship about the Austrian courts’ refusal to grant one of the partners the 
right to adopt the son of the other partner without severing the mother’s legal 
ties with the child. As long as sexual orientation is a concept covered by 
Article 14, and goes to the core of personal autonomy, the Court stated that 
“where a difference of treatment is based on sex or sexual orientation the 
State’s margin of appreciation is narrow”.23 Effectively, what this means is 
that the combination of Articles 8-14 does not significantly influence the 
discretionary power, which remains narrow, and this differs from the 
combination with Article 9. 
 The above analysis shows that, despite the broad scope of the private 
life recognised in the case law, the Court does not offer wide-ranging 
protection. This is especially the case when Article 8 conflicts with Article 
10. For instance, in Lingens v Austria, acknowledging that politicians too 
have a right to the protection of their reputation, the Court argued that this 
protection must be balanced with the need for open debate in a democratic 
society.24 Here again, the Court’s reasoning focuses on the crucial role of the 
press in a democratic society, whilst attaching less importance to personal 
autonomy under Article 8. 
 
2. Article 9  
                                                
20 Munjaz v the United Kingdom, App no 2913/06 (ECHR, 17 July 2012), para 80. 
21 Molka v Poland decision App no 56550/00 (ECHR, 11 April 2006). 
22 Burden v the United Kingdom, App no 13378/05 (ECHR, 29 April 2008), para 60. 
23 X and Others v Austria, App no 19010/07 (ECHR, 19 February 2013), para 99. 
24 Lingens v Austria, App no 9815/82 (ECHR, 8 July 1986), para 42. 
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The first paragraph of Article 9 proclaims freedom of thought, conscience 
and religion. The second paragraph largely replicates the formula used for 
balancing interests that is also comprised in the restriction clauses of Article 
8, 10 and 11. We might thus expect that the reasoning of the Court will be 
fully congruent with the grounds advanced in relation to Articles 10 and 11. 
As for other articles, the abstract wording of the Article required the Court to 
specify the interest(s) that it protects. The ‘general principle’ asserted by the 
Court regarding the role of the freedom of thought, conscience and religion 
in serving ‘democratic society’ is found most clearly in Kokkinakis v 
Greece:  
“as enshrined in Article 9, freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion is one of the foundations of a "democratic society" within the 
meaning of the Convention. It is, in its religious dimension, one of the 
most vital elements that go to make up the identity of believers and 
their conception of life, but it is also a precious asset for atheists, 
agnostics, sceptics and the unconcerned. The pluralism indissociable 
from a democratic society, which has been dearly won over the 
centuries, depends on it”.25 
 Pluralism therefore plays a central justificatory role here too. 
‘Democratic society’, the Court argues, cannot hold without a plurality of 
religious beliefs as it cannot hold without a plurality of political ideas and 
opinions. Yet, the case law of the Court on Article 9 displays some 
particularisms and this is precisely where the dualism arises. It is congruent 
with the continuum of core interests protected by the Court under Article 10 
– 11, but only to a limited extent.  
 More precisely, the cases brought before the Court and the interests 
protected do not amount to a similar level of scrutiny and are not justified 
along the same lines. This is concretely translated by the loose definition of 
the core of the interests protected by the rights, the quasi-absence of positive 
duties generated, as well as a wider margin of appreciation devoted to State 
Parties on a significant set of cases where the Court examines the conception 
of morals within the State Party in question. This is not to say that the Court 
is not protecting Article 9 on independent grounds. ‘Personal identity’, 
‘conception of life’ or ‘dignity’, as in the Kokkinakis case, are instances of 
those. In the absence of convincing arguments given by the respondent State 
Party, the Court does not scrutinize whether the wearing of religious 
                                                
25 Kokkinakis v Greece, App no 14307/88 (ECHR, 25 May 1993), para 31; Eweida and 
others v the United Kingdom, App no 48420/10 (ECHR, 15 January 2013), para 79. 
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symbols, for instance, should be valued on other grounds than those. There 
are typical cases of violations of Article 9 in which the Court finds a 
violation just by discarding the list of possible restriction clauses one after 
the other.26 The clearest case perhaps concerns  curtailing access to places of 
worship and restricting the ability of adherent participants in religious 
observances.27 Yet those justificatory grounds better instantiate the liberal 
standard of state neutrality vis-à-vis individuals and may be distinguished 
from the emphasis on pluralism and its positive dimension. This is precisely 
the justificatory ground advanced by the respondent State Party in Dahlab v 
Switzerland28, reiterated in the recent case of Bayatyan v Armenia: 
“The Court has frequently emphasised the State’s role as the neutral 
and impartial organiser of the exercise of various religions, faiths and 
beliefs, and stated that this role is conducive to public order, religious 
harmony and tolerance in a democratic society. The State’s duty of 
neutrality and impartiality is incompatible with any power on the 
State’s part to assess the legitimacy of religious beliefs or the ways in 
which those beliefs are expressed”.29 
 In other words, Article 9 serves mainly an individual end, while 
Articles 10 – 11 (and Article 3 of Protocol 1) serve a purpose that is 
political, in that it pertains to need for debate on issues of public interest. 
This is all the more true since a clear distinction is made between the former 
and the latter with regard to the restriction clauses: 
“the fundamental nature of the rights guaranteed in Article 9 para. 1 is 
also reflected in the wording of the paragraph providing for 
limitations on them. Unlike the second paragraphs of Articles 8, 10 
and 11 which cover all the rights mentioned in the first paragraphs of 
Articles 8, 10 and 11 ECHR, that of Article 9 refers only to "freedom 
to manifest one’s religion or belief". In so doing, it recognises that in 
democratic societies, in which several religions coexist within one and 
the same population, it may be necessary to place restrictions on this 
freedom in order to reconcile the interests of the various groups and 
ensure that everyone’s beliefs are respected”.30 
                                                
26 See e.g. Ahmet Arslan et autres c Turquie, App no 41135/98 (ECHR, 23 February 
2010), paras 46-52.  
27 Cyprus v Turkey App no 25781/94 (ECHR, 10 May 2001). 
28 Dahlab v Switzerland App no 42393/98 (ECHR, 15 February 2001). 
29 Bayatyan v Armenia, App no 23459/03 (ECHR, 7 July 2011), para 120. 
30 Kokkinakis v Greece (n 24), para 33. 
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It is difficult to explain such an asymmetry – in terms of margin of 
appreciation and justificatory grounds – without emphasizing the respective 
normative weight of those rights in the search for ‘democratic society’. True, 
the emphasis of the Court on pluralism, both on political ideas and religious 
faith, is anchored in the same justificatory pattern; it is deemed foundational 
to democratic society. The protection of pluralism in religious faith is 
conducive to social cohesion, in the Court’s view. As the Court held in 
Erçep v Turkey: 
“Thus, respect on the part of the State towards the beliefs of a minor 
religious group, such as the one to which the applicant belongs, by 
providing its members with the opportunity to serve society as 
dictated by their conscience, is likely to ensure pluralism in the 
cohesion and the stability and to promote religious harmony and 
tolerance within society”.31 
 However, those latter articles rather pertain to the free circulation and 
representation of political ideas and opinions on issues of public interest. By 
contrast, Article 9 remains tied to personal beliefs and conscience – in 
particular, those that have to do with religious faith. The Court made the 
distinction between ‘opinions’ or ‘ideas’ and ‘beliefs’ explicit in Campbell 
and Cosans v the United Kingdom:  
“In its ordinary meaning the word ‘convictions’, taken on its own, is 
not synonymous with the words ‘opinions’ and ‘ideas’, such as are 
utilised in Article 10 of the Convention, which guarantees freedom of 
expression; it is more akin to the term ‘beliefs’ (in the French text: 
‘convictions’) appearing in Article 9 - which guarantees freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion - and denotes views that attain a 
certain level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance”.32 
 As Evans points out, “the Court and Commission have adopted 
relatively narrow definitions of each of the terms, particularly the potentially 
                                                
31 Erçep v Turkey, App no 43965/04 (ECHR, 22 November 2011), para 62. Translated 
from French: « Ainsi, une situation où l’Etat respecte les convictions d’un groupe 
religieux minoritaire, comme celui auquel appartient le requérant, en donnant à ses 
membres la possibilité de servir la société conformément aux exigences de leur 
conscience, est de nature à assurer le pluralisme dans la cohésion et la stabilité et à 
promouvoir l’harmonie religieuse et la tolérance au sein de la société ». 
32 Campbell and Cosans v the United Kingdom, App no 3578/05 (ECHR, 25 Feburary 
1982), para 36. 
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open-ended term ‘practice’”.33 Protection of personal thought, conscience 
and belief clearly implies the right to hold and change those beliefs of one’s 
own accord. As a result, there must be a manifestation of a personal thought, 
conscience or belief of some kind in the public or private sphere. 34 
Moreover, the freedom implies the right to manifest a belief35 or not to 
manifest a belief36 as well as the freedom not to disclose a belief to the state 
– if however the right-holder can prove that the religious belief and its 
implications are really her own.37 The Commission is explicit in Van Den 
Dungen v the Netherlands when it uses the term of ‘forum internum’ as the 
sphere of personal autonomy to be protected: 
“the Commission recalls that Article 9 of the Convention primarily 
protects the sphere of personal beliefs and religious creeds, i.e. the 
area which is sometimes called the forum internum. In addition, it 
protects acts which are intimately linked to these attitudes, such as 
acts of worship or devotion which are aspects of the practice of a 
religion or belief in a generally recognised form”.38 
In Kokkinakis v Greece, the Court emphasised the crucial contribution of 
freedom of religion, conscience and religion in the making of one’s identity 
and conception of life:  
“it is, in its religious dimension, one of the most vital elements that go 
to make up the identity of believers and their conception of life, but it 
is also a precious asset for atheists, agnostics, sceptics and the 
unconcerned. The pluralism indissociable from a democratic society, 
which has been dearly won over the centuries, depends on it”.39 
In this case, there is a continuum in the justificatory grounds advanced by 
the Court between the freedoms of thought, conscience, religion, expression, 
association and assembly. The continuum is provided by the unifying 
requirement of pluralism in European society. But the reasoning of the Court 
reveals a discontinuity between Article 9 and other Articles and therefore 
                                                
33 Carolyn Evans, Freedom of Religion under the European Convention on Human Rights 
(OUP 2001) 103. 
34 Arrowsmith v the United Kingdom, App no 7050/75 (EuComm, 16 May 1977), paras 
71-72. 
35 Buscarini and Others v San Marino, App no 24645/94 (ECHR, 18 February 1999), 
para 39. 
36 Kokkinakis v Greece (n 24), para 31 
37 Kosteski v “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”, App no 55170/00 (ECHR, 
13 April 2006), para 39. 
38 Van Den Dungen v the Netherlands App no 22838/93 (EuComm, 22 February 1995). 
39 Kokkinakis v Greece (n 24), para 31. 
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questions the interests that those rights respectively serve or may serve. 
While the Court had to deal with distinctively political beliefs such as in the 
case of pacifism40 or communism41 and treated their prohibitions as alleged 
violations of Articles 10 and 11, the vast majority of cases scrutinised by the 
Court concerns the holding of religious beliefs and the limits of the 
manifestation of those beliefs. As indicated above, Article 9 does not protect 
any kind of belief or any kind of manifestation of the belief. It can therefore 
be said that it determines the scope of the rights without however specifying 
the core interest that the right protects. In the seminal case of Pretty v United 
Kingdom, which pertains to the belief in assisted suicide, the Court held that: 
“the Court does not doubt the firmness of the applicant's views 
concerning assisted suicide but would observe that not all opinions or 
convictions constitute beliefs in the sense protected by Article 9 s1 of 
the Convention. Her claims do not involve a form of manifestation of 
a religion or belief, through worship, teaching, practice or observance 
as described in the second sentence of the first paragraph. As found by 
the Commission, the term ‘practice’ as employed in Article 9 s1 does 
not cover each act which is motivated or influenced by a religion or 
belief”.42 
 In other words, although the terms contained in the Article are wide, 
the reasoning of the Court indicates a narrow approach focused on the 
intensity and stringency of personal thoughts and beliefs – those typically 
associated with religious faith and worship. In the same vein, the Court does 
not protect a group’s cultural identity43, the disposal of human remains after 
death44 or the distribution of anti-abortion material45 within the scope of 
Article 9. This is where the prevalent interest protected by Article 9 can be 
identified. Personal beliefs falling within Article 9 must attain a certain level 
of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance and the belief must reflect 
a ‘weighty and substantial aspect of human life and behaviour’. This 
stringency significantly reduces the margin of appreciation devoted to State 
Parties. This is precisely where the dualist reasoning arises. Such a twofold 
approach cannot be justified only by reference to the fact that the exercise of 
the freedom of though can consist in an internal exercise or external 
                                                
40 Arrowsmith v the United Kingdom (n 33). 
41 Acik v Turkey, App no 31451/03 (ECHR, 13 January 2009). 
42 Pretty v the United Kingdom (n 10), para 82. 
43 Sidiropoulos v Greece, App no 26695/95 (ECHR, 10 July 1998). 
44 Belgian Linguistic Case, App no 1474/62 (ECHR, 23 July 1968). 
45 Knudsen v Norway, App no 11045/84 (ECHR, 8 March 1985). 
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exercise. It is difficult to distinguish ‘personal autonomy’ as applying only to 
those mental states if the ground to attribute the margin of appreciation 
depends on the presence of such ‘cogen 
cy’ or ‘seriousness’.  
 
3. Article 10  
The right to freedom of expression, guaranteed by Article 10, clearly holds a 
prominent status in the pursuit of ‘democratic society’ as the Court held in 
its seminal judgment in Handyside v United Kingdom. It is “one of the 
essential foundations of such a society, one of the basic conditions for its 
progress and for the development of every man (…)”.46 The normative force 
of the freedom of expression is therefore derived from democracy as it 
permits the development of individuals. This is a point recently confirmed in 
Szima v Hungary, where the Court held that freedom of expression is “one of 
the basic conditions for its progress and for each individual’s self-
fulfilment”.47 
 More importantly, the Court has connected freedom of expression to 
the pluralism that should animate a democratic society. As repeatedly 
asserted, “democracy thrives on freedom of expression”.48 Reviewing the 
role of the press in Handyside v United Kingdom, the Court emphasised that 
the exercise of the freedom of expression contributes to debates on political 
matters and issues of public interest. In other words, the normative force 
originates in the content of the views to be expressed – those views that 
pertain to an issue of public interest. Pluralism is therefore of paramount 
importance in the Court’s specification of the scope of the right to freedom 
of expression and central to its underlying conception of ‘democratic 
society’. There is a clear instrumental connection between the former and 
the latter. As the Court held in Handyside v United Kingdom,  
“it is applicable not only to ‘information’ or ‘ideas’ that are 
favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of 
indifference, but also to those that offend, shock or disturb the State or 
any sector of the population. Such are the demands of that pluralism, 
                                                
46 Handyside v United Kingdom (n 6), para 49. 
47 Szima v Hungary, App no 29723/11 (ECHR, 9 October 2012), para 25; see also Animal 
Defenders International v the United Kingdom, App no 48876/08 (ECHR, 22 April 
2013), para 100. 
48 ÖZDEP v Turkey (n 8), para 44. 
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tolerance and broadmindedness without which there is no ‘democratic 
society’”.49  
 Clearly, pluralism is neatly tied to the expression of political ideas and 
opinions in the Court’s view. This has been a constant position of the Court 
from the Handyside case in 1969 until today. In Porubova v Russia, the 
Court “reiterates this connection that under Article 10 s2 of the Convention 
very strong reasons are required to justify restrictions on political speech or 
debates on questions of public interest”. 50  Why is political pluralism 
important in the Court’s view? The Court has specified what it takes to be 
the predominant reasons not only for protecting, but also actively promoting 
political pluralism. Most importantly, the Court has specified the object to be 
protected: ideas and opinions on issues of public interest. Secondly, it has 
specified the conditions in which those ideas and opinions should be 
expressed, that is, that they should be presented within an arena of informed, 
public and plural debate.  
 The Court makes explicit that one’s views on issues of public interest 
should be informed by the public, transparent and adversarial discussion of 
views on issues of public interest. The Court has made this point clear in 
Piermont v France: “a person opposed to official ideas and positions must be 
able to find a place in the political arena”.51 In Erdoğdu and İnce v Turkey, 
the Court found a violation of Article 10 on the ground that the interview of 
a sociologist pertaining to the analysis of the political situation in South-East 
Turkey cannot be conceived as exacerbating the Kurdish nationalist 
sentiment in the region. As the Court held,  
“domestic authorities in the instant case failed to have sufficient 
regard to the public’s right to be informed of a different perspective 
on the situation in south-east Turkey, irrespective of how unpalatable 
that perspective may be for them”.52  
 The prevalent justification is therefore that views on issues of public 
interest should be informed and confronted within the public arena – with 
particular emphasis on the actions of elected governments. As the Court held 
                                                
49 Handyside v United Kingdom (n 6), para 49. See also Jersild v Denmark, App no 
15890/89 (ECHR, 23 September 1994), para 37. 
50 Porubova v Russia, App no 8237/03 (ECHR, 8 October 2009), para 42. 
51 Piermont v France, App no 15773/89 (ECHR, 27 April 1995),  para 76. 
52 Erdoğdu and İnce v Turkey, App no 25067/94 (ECHR, 8 July 1999), para 51. For a 
recent case, see Çamyar and Berktaş v Turkey, App no 41959/02 (ECHR, 15 February 
2011), paras 37-38.ß 
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in Yazar v Turkey, “in a democratic system the actions or omissions of the 
government must be subject to the close scrutiny not only of the legislative 
and judicial authorities but also of the press and public opinion”.53 Not only 
does the search for political pluralism help the Court develop and specify the 
content of the reasons that justify various ECHR rights, but this specification 
in turn determines prominent right-holders, such as the press in the case of 
Article 10 or political parties in the case of Article 11. This identification 
leads the Court to scrutinise the content of their views, expressed with a high 
degree of rigour.  
 Moreover, when the Court has to examine an ECHR right that 
conflicts with Article 10, such as the right to reputation under Article 8, the 
Court clearly focuses its assessment on Article 10, despite the recognition of 
the conflict of rights. It reasserts the normative breadth of the right to 
freedom of expression but does not specify the breadth of the conflicting 
right. This is most clear in cases involving the defamation of politicians. 
Indeed, it is settled case-law that,  
“in cases concerning debates or questions of general public interest, 
the extent of acceptable criticism is greater in respect of politicians or 
other public figures than in respect of private individuals: the former, 
unlike the latter, have voluntarily exposed themselves to a close 
scrutiny of their actions by both journalists and the general public and 
must therefore show a greater degree of tolerance”.54 
 
4. Article 11 
The reasoning of the Court on Article 11 clearly lacks an independent 
normative basis. It is to a significant extent reduced to the grounds specified 
for Article 10. A clear instance of this is when the applicant claims that both 
Articles were violated, with the Court assessing just the merits of the case 
under Article 10. This is the case for instance in Steel and Others v United 
Kingdom: “the Court does not find that this complaint raises any issues not 
already examined in the context of Article 10. For this reason it is 
unnecessary to consider it”.55 In Vogt v Germany, the Court specified that 
“the protection of personal opinions, secured by Article 10, is one of the 
                                                
53 Yazar v Turkey, App no 51483/99 (ECHR, 7 October 2004), para 59.  
54 Petrenco v Moldova, App no 20928/05 (ECHR, 30 March 2010), para 55; Petrina v. 
Romania, App no 78060/01 (ECHR, 14 October 2008), para 40. 
55 Steel and Others v United Kingdom, App no 24838/94 (ECHR, 23 September 1998), 
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objectives of the freedoms of assembly and association as enshrined in 
Article 11”.56 When the Court makes explicit the distinctive roles that each 
right plays, the continuum is salient. In a nutshell, the Court clearly takes 
association to be a collective form of expression. The leitmotiv of the Court 
is the following:  
“The Court reiterates that notwithstanding its autonomous role and 
particular sphere of application, Article 11 must also be considered in 
the light of Article 10. The protection of opinions and the freedom to 
express them is one of the objectives of the freedoms of assembly and 
association as enshrined in Article 11. That applies all the more in 
relation to political parties in view of their essential role in ensuring 
pluralism and the proper functioning of democracy (…)”.57 
 Once the essentially political purpose of Article 11 is established, the 
Court focuses its closest assessment and enlarges the scope of application on 
the political forms of association – those associations whose aim is to 
express views on issues of public interest. Still, in Stankov and the United 
Macedonian Organisation Ilinden v Bulgaria, in which the Court reviewed 
the activities of an organisation fostering the recognition of the Macedonian 
minority in Bulgaria, the Court specified the stringent interest behind the 
freedom of association and the link to freedom of expression:  
“such a link is particularly relevant where – as here – the authorities’ 
intervention against an assembly or an association was, at least in part, 
in reaction to views held or statements made by participants or 
members”.58 
 In others words, given the proximity of Article 11 and Article 10 in 
the interests they protect, the Court tends to enlarge the scope of application 
of Article 11 to a similar extent. In Güneri and others v Turkey, the Court 
brought the instrumental link between Article 11 and democracy even closer 
– without however making explicit the claim that freedom of assembly is 
derived from democracy:  
“The Court reiterates that the freedom of assembly and the right to 
express one’s views through it are among the paramount values of a 
democratic society. The essence of democracy is its capacity to 
                                                
56 Vogt v Germany, App no 17851/91 (ECHR, 2 September 1996), para 64. 
57 United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden and Others v Bulgaria, App no 59491/00 
(ECHR, 19 January 2006), para 27. 
58 ibid, para 85. 
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resolve problems through open debate. Sweeping measures of a 
preventive nature to suppress freedom of assembly and expression 
other than in cases of incitement to violence or rejection of democratic 
principles – however shocking and unacceptable certain views or 
words used may appear to the authorities, and however illegitimate 
the demands made may be – disserve democracy and often even 
endanger it. In a democratic society based on the rule of law, political 
ideas which challenge the existing order and whose realisation is 
advocated by peaceful means must be offered a proper opportunity of 
expression through the exercise of the right of assembly as well as by 
other lawful means”.59 
 It follows from the above that as long as the freedom of expression 
mainly consists in expressing a view on an issue of public interest, the Court 
considers the role of the personal autonomy under Article 11 ECHR solely 
as an interpretative tool, which does not affect the extent of the margin of 
appreciation granted. In this regard, the Court stated in Sørensen and 
Rasmussen v Denmark that : 
“The notion of personal autonomy is an important principle 
underlying the interpretation of the Convention guarantees. This 
notion must therefore be seen as an essential corrollary of the 
individual’s freedom of choice implicit in Article 11 and confirmation 
of the importance of the negative aspect of that provision”.60 
                                                
59 Güneri and Others v Turkey, App no 42853/98 (ECHR, 12 July 2005), para 76. 
Translated from French: « La Cour rappelle que la liberté de réunion et le droit 
d’exprimer ses vues à travers cette liberté font partie des valeurs fondamentales d’une 
société démocratique. L’essence de la démocratie tient à sa capacité à résoudre des 
problèmes par un débat ouvert. Des mesures radicales de nature préventive visant à 
supprimer la liberté de réunion et d’expression en dehors des cas d’incitation à la violence 
ou de rejet des principes démocratiques – aussi choquants et inacceptables que peuvent 
sembler certains points de vue ou termes utilisés aux yeux des autorités, et aussi 
illégitimes les exigences en question puissent-elles être – desservent la démocratie, voire, 
souvent, la mettent en péril. Dans une société démocratique fondée sur la prééminence du 
droit, les idées politiques qui contestent l’ordre établi et dont la réalisation est défendue 
par des moyens pacifiques, doivent se voir offrir une possibilité convenable de s’exprimer 
à travers l’exercice de la liberté de réunion ainsi que par d’autres moyens légaux ». 
60 Sørensen and Rasmussen v Denmark, App no 52562/99 (ECHR, 11 January 2006), 
para 54; see also Vörđur Ólafsson v Iceland, App no 20161/06 (ECHR, 27 April 2010), 
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C. THE TROUBLE WITH “PERSONAL AUTONOMY” 
1. Rights and Autonomy 
In this section, we turn to our critical appraisal of the Court’s dualist 
reasoning through normative theorising. We argue that the dualist approach 
stands in need of clarification and justification. The first step of our 
argument was that the concept of rights is normatively connected to the one 
of autonomy, in the abstract sense that rights serve or are owed to 
individuals qua autonomous agents. While right-holders disagree over the 
reasons why they value such a space of freedom, how they make use of it, 
and what its scope is, right-holders have an overarching interest in those 
rights that may be captured by the concept of autonomy. The wording of 
ECHR rights (except ‘institutional’ rights, such as the right to elections 
under Article 3 of Protocol 1) suggests that they aim to secure an individual 
space against state intervention.  
 It is therefore the content of ECHR rights that may be justified by the 
concept of autonomy vis-à-vis the state. It does not entail that rights are 
sufficient for autonomy – one may think of the independent value of the rule 
of law as a necessary condition for autonomy – or that the status of ECHR 
rights qua rights is justified by autonomy. As Raz argues, valuing autonomy 
– or the interest(s) of the right-holder more generally – cannot be sufficient 
to establish a right to it: “by that argument if the love of my children is the 
most important thing then I have a right to it”.61 Also, the claim does not 
entail that the duties correlated to those rights are necessarily justified by an 
abstract concept of autonomy. As we shall explain, since human rights are 
thick and abstract norms, legal reasoning – in particular, when the Court 
applies restriction standards – tends towards a specification rather than an 
abstraction of the concept of autonomy. Legal reasoning cannot rely on an 
abstract moral claim to generate the action-guiding reasons that litigants 
expect. 
 The overarching justificatory role of autonomy is best seen by 
addressing its definition in moral and political theory together with moral 
psychology. Most importantly, we must distinguish between, on the one 
hand, autonomy qua ‘capacity of the will’ that captures the human ability to 
reflect on the adequacy of one’s own reasons for action to make those 
reasons one’s own, and autonomy qua moral principle, on the other hand, 
                                                
61 Joseph Raz, ‘Human Rights Without Foundations’, in Samantha Besson and John 
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that addresses the moral, non-instrumental reasons to refrain from interfering 
with the autonomy of others. Of course, in our case-study the second 
component is specified by the primary duty-holder of human rights norms, 
that is, the modern state. The state has reasons to refrain from interfering 
with its subjects on the basis of their capacity for autonomy and therefore 
conceives those subjects as possessing moral autonomy.  
 The first and internal component originates in Kant and focuses on the 
inherent capacity for self-rule.62 This component has been developed in 
moral theory and moral psychology and addresses the non-substantive 
conditions needed for reflective and critical capacities not to be subverted.63 
Note that we also find a similar component in the emerging field of 
normative human rights theory as in Griffin’s account of ‘personhood’: “we 
value our status as human beings especially high, often more highly than 
even our happiness. This status centres on our being agents – deliberating, 
assessing, choosing, and acting to make what we see as a good life for 
ourselves”.64 In Griffin’s view, ‘personhood’ justifies most of the human 
rights that we find in conventional lists of international law. The crucial 
element here is that the agent is able to identify with its own choices and 
therefore autonomy fully includes the deliberative process (absorb, process, 
remember, etc.). Moral theorists such as Frankfurt have emphasised that 
autonomy requires second-order identification with first-order desires or 
value-judgments.65 One immediate implication here is that the exercise of 
autonomy must be independent from manipulation by others. Manipulation 
alters or perverts one’s capacity to reflect upon the reasons available to the 
extent that the  reason selected is not truly one’s own.  
 This first component of autonomy is salient in the reasoning of the 
Court and most notably under Article 9, as freedom of thought and religion 
is held to be one of the “most vital elements that go to make up the identity 
of believers and their conception of life, but it is also a precious asset for 
atheists, agnostics, sceptics and the unconcerned (…)”.66 We may also 
                                                
62 Cf. Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, (Mary J. Gregor ed, 
CUP 1998), Section III. 
63 See the contributions in John Christman (ed), The Inner Citadel: Essays on Individual 
Autonomy (OUP 1989). See also the contributions in John Christman and Joel Anderson 
(eds), Autonomy and the Challenges to Liberalism: New Essays (CUP 2005). 
64 James Griffin, On Human Rights (OUP 2008), 32. 
65 See HG Frankfurt, ‘Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person’ (1971) 68 The 
Journal of Philosophy  5. 
66 Kokkinakis v Greece (n 24), para 31; Eweida and others v the United Kingdom, App no 
48420/10 (ECHR, 15 January 2013), para 79. 
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mention the Court’s determination of the scope of Article 8 and the need to 
protect “the development, without outside interference, of the personality of 
each individual in his relations with other human beings. There is therefore a 
zone of interaction of a person with others, even in a public context, which 
may fall within the scope of private life”.67 This first component is also 
implicit in the Court’s reasoning under Article 10 through the wider 
protection of political opinions. One of the Court’s leitmotivs reiterated in 
the recent Szima v Hungary is that freedom of expression is central to 
democratic society – “one of the basic conditions for its progress and for 
each individual’s self-fulfilment”.68 The same point is valid for Article 11, as 
outlined above. In Vogt v Germany, the Court held that “the protection of 
personal opinions, secured by Article 10, is one of the objectives of the 
freedoms of assembly and association as enshrined in Article 11”.69  
 By contrast, the second, external component of autonomy posits a 
moral and substantive obligation towards others and justifies taking action 
on its behalf to protect one from external interference. Liberals require 
giving justification for interfering with one’s freedom. Although it 
constitutes a strong requirement, “consent is significant from the standpoint 
of external freedom because it can make otherwise wrongful acts rightful”.70 
The responsiveness to such reasons is central to the implications of the 
specifically Kantian concept of autonomy. Most recently, Valentini has 
argued that human rights reflect the right to freedom understood in a Kantian 
sense and does not distinguish the rights that serve autonomy from those that 
do not: “each person must possess a well-demarcated sphere of agency (a 
certain ‘quantity’ of freedom), defined by her rights, in which she is robustly 
protected from external interference”.71 One may go on to draw the stronger 
conclusion that the exercise of autonomy is inherently valuable. As Raz puts 
it, “it is hard to conceive of an argument that possession of a capacity is 
valuable even though its exercise of it devoid of value”.72 Another disputable 
                                                
67 Pfeifer v Austria, App no 24733/04 (ECHR, 17 February 2011), para 33. 
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implication pertains to the need for a set of options among which the 
autonomous agent exercises the capacity for self-legislation. Raz for instance 
argues “all that has to be accepted is that to be autonomous a person must 
not only be given a choice but he must be given an adequate range of 
choices”.73 The range of options cannot but come from the ‘external’ so that 
a person lives autonomously “if he lives in a certain environment, an 
environment which respects the condition of independence and furnishes 
him with an adequate range of options”.74 The emphasis of the Court on the 
“public’s right to be informed of a different perspective on the situation 
(…)”75 under Article 10 and the positive obligations that follow from it 
suggests the importance of a set of options.  
 The overall point here is that the protection of (ECHR) rights is 
predicated on a non-instrumental reason: the abstract right to autonomy. As 
Valentini puts it, “human rights are those protections that any state must 
provide for its citizens if it is to make a reasonable claim to respect their 
right to freedom”.76 As a result, autonomy qua capacity and qua moral 
principle plays an overarching justificatory role for (ECHR) rights in general 
and Articles 8 – 11 in particular. We believe that the routine of adjudication 
of the Court facing an ever-growing number of situations, asks for a 
specification of the kind of autonomy protected in given circumstances and 
that examining the restrictions of ECHR rights is the best way to understand 
the Court’s concept of autonomy. It therefore follows that associating 
‘personal autonomy’ only to a particular range of deliberative and cognitive 
states – typically those involving the forum internum – and making the case 
either subject to a stricter scrutiny or the margin of appreciation contingent 
upon this unspecified concept is precarious. There is no reason to assign the 
concept to a particular situation at the cost of relegating others arbitrarily. As 
a result, the Court needs to explain the circumscribed role that ‘personal 
autonomy’ has played until today in the case law – in particular in face of an 
isolated claim that it is an ‘underlying principle’ of the ECHR. As Letsas 
puts it, “we cannot inflate the concept of human rights so much that it covers 
the whole realm of justice. Human rights would then lose their distinctive 
moral force”.77 The same goes for ‘personal autonomy’. 
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2. Autonomy, Human Rights and Democracy  
The first step of our argument is that, given the overarching justificatory role 
autonomy plays for the content of ECHR rights, we may expect the Court to 
specify this role through adjudication in general and restriction standards in 
particular. The second step is that the Court has in fact specified autonomy 
through the application of restriction standards under Articles 8 – 11 and 
trough the third clause of ‘democratic society’ more specifically. Here, we 
bring normative theorising not from an independent or ideal perspective, but 
from within the balancing of the Court in the case law under those 
provisions.  
 As we have explained in the second section of the article, the ECtHR 
is strongly attached to the expression of views on issues of public interest. 
This standard is decisive in the balancing on Articles 8 – 11 and its presence 
significantly reduces the margin of appreciation. In this regard we should 
also mention the interdependence, in the Court’s view, of Article 3 of 
Protocol 1, protecting the right to regular, free and fair elections with Article 
10 (freedom of expression) and Article 11 (freedom of association) on the 
one hand, and of Article 2 of Protocol 1 ensuring access to education, with 
Article 9 (freedom of thought) on the other hand. It transpires from the case 
law that the Court is not only protecting individuals from state interference 
as the classical requirement of state neutrality. It is therefore openly 
promoting a conception of ‘democracy’ and ‘democratic society’. In our 
view, such promotion distinguishes the prevalent conception of autonomy 
developed by the Court. It filters the reasons that enlarge or restrict the scope 
of Articles 8 – 11. 
 Two premises from normative democratic theory are needed to clarify 
this part of the argument. The first is that the justification of democracy or 
‘democratic society’ cannot hold without the presumption of autonomy, as 
defined above. The justification of democracy implies a deontological 
premise of the equal right to have a say on issues of public interest. Note that 
accepting this premise is independent from the ultimate standard for 
justifying the bindingness of majority voting. One may invoke deep 
disagreement, as by Christiano78 or Waldron79, or invoke a deliberative view 
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of democracy involving an endorsement constraint, as per Cohen.80 In other 
words, while the justification of democracy may not rely on autonomy for its 
binding force, the respect of equal political status in deliberation prior to 
vote requires the basic conditions for autonomy (capacity, independence and 
set of options) outlined above. Early democratic theorists, such as Dahl, 
endorse the ‘presumption of autonomy’: “to accept the idea of personal 
autonomy among adults, then, is to establish a presumption that in making 
individual or collective choices each adult ought to be treated – for purposes 
of making decisions – as the proper judge of his or her own interests”.81 
More recent theorists of democracy, such as Christiano, assume a conception 
of the person as “authorities in the realm of value”.82 
 The second premise concerns the justificatory link between human 
rights and democracy recently defended in human rights theory. While 
Griffin represents the foundationalist approach to human rights, one may 
find a political and democratic approach that depends on a qualified concept 
of autonomy. The central idea here is that human rights protect the interests 
of individuals by virtue of their equal political status qua members of a 
political community. Besson suggests that the concept of equal political 
status is the “point of passage”83 from a general and fundamental interest to a 
human right. Moreover, following Christiano, respecting (human) rights 
makes sure that individuals are treated as equals publicly. As Besson 
explains, “public or political equality implies that people can see that they 
are treated as equals by others and this takes the form of its recognition by 
the law and institutions (...)”.84 The insistence of the Court on the views of 
minorities being heard is here central.85  
 This not only allows us to envision that autonomy, human rights, and 
democracy may reinforce each other – a claim that would ask for a more 
elaborate defence, of course. It can also illuminate the Court’s higher 
protection of the expression of views on issues of public interest as justified 
                                                
80 See e.g. Joshua Cohen, ‘Procedure and Substance in Deliberative Democracy’, in 
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81 Robert A Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics (Yale University Press 1989), 100. 
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84 Samantha Besson, ‘The Egalitarian Dimension of Human Rights’ (2012) Archiv Für 
Sozial- Und Rechtsphilosophie Beiheft 19. 
85 Young, James and Webster v United Kingdom, App no. 7601/76 (ECHR, 18 August 
1981). 
UCL Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 
 
 253 
upon the need for recognition and cohesion in society and therefore their 
equal right to have their views heard on those issues.  
 In other words, our conclusive argument here is that the Court has 
specified the concept of autonomy through the application of restriction 
standards and the appeal to a substantive conception of ‘democratic society’, 
in which autonomy qua political equality is central for the legitimacy of 
political decision-making by State Parties. As our analysis of the case law 
has shown, such a standard is systematically used to demarcate the margin of 
appreciation. An interesting recent case is the Court’s assessment of the 
prohibition of a gay parade in Russia in Alekseyev v Russia.86 The Court 
made clear that, while the issue of sexual minorities is still subject to a 
consensualist approach, the very fact of exercising the right to campaign for 
their right cannot be. A wider concept of autonomy could justify the 
protection of gay rights, but the specified concept of autonomy via 
‘democratic society’ cannot. Autonomy qua political equality is reinforced 
as far as the core democratic rights are concerned. In our view, this is a clear 
instance of the specification of the abstract right to autonomy through 
adjudication and restriction standards.  
 
D. CONCLUSION 
The overall conclusion that emerges is that the Court needs to clarify and 
justify its use of the concept of ‘personal autonomy’. We have reached this 
conclusion through the interrelation of case analysis and normative 
theorising. We believe, on the methodological level, that both cannot be 
firmly distinguished in order to both illuminate and critically appraise the 
reasoning of the Court under Articles 8 – 11. ‘Personal autonomy’ and 
‘democratic society’ – as human rights norms in general – are just too thick 
and indeterminate concepts to be apprehended without a grip on both the 
very localised practice of the Court and the conceptual and normative 
explorations of moral and political theorists.  
 The first step of our argument was descriptive and analytical. We have 
furnished an overview of the case law on Articles 8 – 11 and identified a 
salient dualist approach. Most importantly, we have argued that personal 
autonomy plays a very circumscribed role – most clearly under Article 8 – 
without being independently defined. The Court’s distinction between forum 
internum and forum externum is similarly analysed. While the former is 
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viewed as a ‘friend’ of democratic society requirements, in that the Court 
exercises a strict scrutiny to ensure its respect, the latter is viewed as a ‘foe’ 
since the discretion given to national authorities. More generally, while one 
may say that the Court was tempted to derive a ‘right’ to personal autonomy 
under Article 8, it appears that such a right was decisive only in a very 
limited number of cases, and when it was, it suprisingly determined the 
margin of appreciation.  
 The second step of the argument consisted in viewing the reasoning of 
the Court through the prism of both moral and political theory and, within 
those fields, of recent contributions to human rights theory. We have argued 
that it is difficult to delimit the normative role of autonomy, or use it as as 
restriction ground, given its overarching justificatory power. We have also 
suggested that autonomy, human rights and democracy are connected 
through the decisive clause of ‘democratic society’. The Court’s own 
emphasis on the provisions that serve ‘democratic society’, and the relatively 
thin margin of appreciation, cannot hold without a strong commitment to a 
qualified concept of autonomy, that is, the right to have an equal say on 
issues of public interest. ‘Personal autonomy’ and ‘democratic society’ 
cannot be friends and foes at the same time – the Court must assume that 
autonomy and the human person that is granted such a status is itself a 
dualist concept.  
